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REOPENING THE DEBATE: POSTJUDGMENT
CERTIFICATION IN RULE 23(b)(3)
CLASS ACTIONS
The rule 23(b)(3) class action' stands alone among federal class
actions 2 in the "storm center of Rule 23." '  Despite two complete
revisions of the rule,4 commentators have initiated a call for yet a
third. 5 Rule reform, however, has been unsuccessful to date,' so
The requirements of a 23(b)(3) class action are as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied [requiring that class be so
numerous that joinder is impracticable, common questions of law or fact exist, the
representative's claim is typical of class claims, and that representative fairly and
adequately protect class interests], and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
2 Subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) of rule 23 describe the other two types of federal class
actions. See note 12 and accompanying text infra.
' Schuck, An Overview of Class Actions, 70 F.R.D. 289, 297 (1976).
4 Following adoption of the modem federal class action rule in 1938, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
23, 308 U.S. 689 (1940), rule 23 was revised substantially in 1966. See generally Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Rules Relating to 1966 Amendments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 39
F.R.D. 98-107 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Cqmmittee Notes].
' The following is typical of recent criticism: "Rule 23(b)(3). . . was designed to improve
the [class] action's efficiency and protect the interests of defendants and absent parties. These
goals, however, have yet to be realized after thirteen years of experience with the rule." Berry,
Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage
Action, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 299, 299-300 (1980) (footnote omitted).
In 1978, Senators DeConcini and Kennedy introduced a bill that would completely
revamp (b)(3) class action law. See S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The Bill divides class
damage actions into two categories. First, a "public action" would enable the federal govern-
ment, or an individual on its behalf, to sue the class opponent for claims that are too small to
litigate individually. Instead of class plaintiffs sharing directly in the recovery, the government
would institute its own procedures for distributing the money award. This innovation would
make the public action procedurally simpler than current law. Second, the "private compensa-
tory action" would allow individual plaintiffs with claims over $300 to sue under detailed
procedures set out in the Bill. Id. See generally Berry, supra, at 321-43; Miller, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem, " 92 HARV. L. REV. 664
(1979) (criticizing S. 3475); see also Kennedy, Federal Class Actions: A Need for Legislative Reform,
32 Sw. L.J. 1209 (1979); Note, Reforming Federal Class Action Procedure: An Analysis of the Justice
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courts may be expected to continue their efforts to refine the common
law of class action procedure. One area deserving of such refinement
pertains to the question whether courts may wait until after judgment
to certify a suit' as a 23(b)(3) class action.
Although champions of rule reform have not pointed to the
postjudgment certification issue as a reason supporting amendment of
rule 23,8 judicial confusion in this area is evident. Some courts have
suggested that postjudgment certification in 23(b)(3) actions is imper-
missible,' while others have allowed it under certain ill-defined "equi-
table exceptions." 10 Consequently, both judicial efficiency in class
management and substantive party rights have suffered. This Note
argues that neither rule 23 nor judicial precedent precludes postjudg-
ment certification in all circumstances. Instead of imposing a per se
prohibition against postjudgment certification or applying an equita-
ble exceptions approach to it, courts should adopt a discretionary test
that draws on principles of modern res judicata law. Such an approach
would promote more effectively judicial efficiency and substantive
class interests while protecting the class defendant from prejudice.
Department Proposal, 16 HARV. J. LEGIs. 543 (1979); Note, Manageability of Class Actions under S.
3475: Congress Confronts the Policy Choices Revealed in Rule 23(b)(3) Litigation, 68 Ky. L.J. 216
(1980).
6 Senate Bill 3475 did not receive final consideration and has not yet been reintroduced in
the Senate. In 1979, Representative Neal Smith introduced H.R. 5103, which generally
addresses some of the same concerns outlined in earlier proposals. H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). The Bill was referred to the Small Business Committee and the Judiciary
Committee, but only the Small Business Committee held hearings and mark-up. On January
5, 1981, Representative Smith reintroduced the Bill in the 97th Congress, see H.R. 13, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), but no action had been taken on it as of the time this Note went to
press.
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
8 Recent criticism of rule 23(b)(3) may be divided into four categories. The first is that the
requirements of subdivisions 23(a) & 23(b)(3) that the class action be superior to available
alternatives and that the named plaintiff adequately represent the class, are drawn inefficiently.
Second, the rule poorly articulates when the court should decide the merits, which can thereby
delay the consideration of the plaintiffs claim. Third, practical difficulties in communicating
with class members make individual recovery inefficient. Berry, supra note 5, at 302-20. The
fourth and broadest criticism is that the (b)(3) action should not be permitted in any form
because of its negative effect on the administration ofjustice. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356,
394 (1967); Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199,
203 (1976); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973).
o See note 39 and accompanying text infra.
o See notes 43-71 and accompanying text infra. Commentators also disagree about whether
(b)(3) certification must precede the merits decision. Compare, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
CouRTs 351 & n.52 (3d ed. 1976) (certification required before judgment) with 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02-2, at 101 & n.45 (2d ed. 1981) (motions to dismiss and summary
judgment motions permissible before certification).
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RULE 23 AND ONE-WAY INTERVENTION
A. The 1966 Amendment
In response to the "[d]espondency over the inadequacies of
[the 1938 class action rule],"" the 1966 Rules Advisory Committee
formulated rule 23(b) into a tripartite scheme. Subdivision (b)(1)
permits a class action if individual actions otherwise would require
"incompatible standards of conduct" by the class opponent or
threaten the interests of nonparties. Subdivision (b)(2) allows a class
action if injunctive or declaratory relief is "generally applicable to the
class." ' 2  Subdivision (b)(3), like the 1938 rule, 13 requires that the
court find "questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class" and that the common questions predominate over individual
questions. In addition, the court must determine that a class action is
superior to other means of adjudicating the particular claims. 14  Un-
like the plaintiff in the old spurious class action,1 5 the (b)(3) named
11 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 386. The former rule 23 divided class actions into three
categories according to the nature of the rights involved. The "true" class action involved a
right that was "joint, or common, or secondary." The "hybrid" action pertained to rights that
were "several," with claims that affected specific property. The third category, the "spurious"
action, was for adjudication of rights that were "several, and [where] there [was] a common
question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief [was] sought." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a), 308 U.S. 689 (1940). For a summary of the criticisms of the former rule, see
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 380-86.
12 An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(2).
13 See note 11 supra.
14 FED. R.. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
15 The spurious class action, see note 11 supra, was "simply a form of 'permissive joinder'
device," Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1968)
(footnote omitted), in that the potential class member had to seek affirmatively to join the
action. "When a suit was brought by or against such a class, it was merely an invitation to
joinder-an invitation to become a fellow traveler in the litigation, which might or might not
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plaintiff'" acts in a representative capacity on behalf of all class mem-
bers who fail to "opt out," or remove themselves' from the action.17
In spurious class actions, courts allowed or suggested "one-way
intervention," a practice that permitted class members to intervene in
an action after the original named plaintiff had obtained a favorable
judgment.' Some criticized this practice as violating the doctrine of
be accepted." 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10[l], at 2603 (2d ed. 1981). Under
modem rule 23(c)(2), if the putative class member fails to opt out after receiving notice, he
automatically becomes part of the class, and res judicata prevents him from subsequently suing
the class opponent. See Ameican Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) ("A
federal class action is no longer an 'invitation to joinder' but [is] a truly representative
suit .... "). But cf Advisoy Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 106 (court can only decide "extent
or coverage" of judgment; res judicata effect determined in subsequent action).
18 This Note assumes that all (b)(3) class actions involve a plaintiff class and defendant class
opponent. Commentators have, however, noted a rise in defendant class actions, in which a
single plaintiff sues a class of defendants. According to one observer, "most defendant class
actions for money damages will be brought [under subdivision (b)(3) of rule 23]." Wolfson,
Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 459, 493 (1977). See also Note, Defendant Class Actions,
91 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978).
For purposes of postjudgment certification, it would be advantageous to the plaintiff in a
defendant class action to seek early certification in order to prevent the class defendants from
opting out after judgment, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), and avoiding liability; thus, separate
consideration in this Note of defendant class actions should not be necessary. Moreover,
certification following a plaintiff's judgment in a defendant class action would raise substantial
due process questions, see generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1786 (1972), just as would certification following a defendant's judgment in a
plaintiff class action. In both cases, the judgment may bind parties not represented in court.
Certification following a plaintiff's judgment in a plaintiff class action, however, normally
should not offend traditional due process considerations. This is in part because such certifica-
tion would not be attempted in the absence of a plaintiff's verdict; hence no absent party would
face the possibility of being bound by an adverse judgment.
17 In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reason-
able effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appear-
ance through his counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See also id. 23(c)(3).
18 See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying 1938 rule);
DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9tth Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 950 (1964); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir.
1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 856 (3d
Cir. 1945); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D.
510 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 100 F. Supp. 461, 463 (D. Del. 1951);
Tolliver v. Cudahy Packing Co., 39 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); Alabama Ind.
Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Pet. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386, 390 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
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mutality of estoppel,' 9 prejudicing the class opponent's defenses and
impairing his reliance interest,20 and discouraging putative class
members from contributing to the named plaintiffs litigation ex-
penses.21 The 1966 Rules Advisory Committee did not specify its
objections to this practice, but the Advisory Committee's Note accom-
panying the proposed rule 23 states that under subdivision (c)(3),
"one-way intervention is excluded." 2 2
Though the Committee pointed to subdivision (c)(3), courts have
not been in agreement about which subdivision of rule 23(c), if any,
accomplishes the "exclusion" of one-way intervention.2 3  Subdivi-
sion (c)(1) encourages, but does not compel, class certification prior to
judgment by requiring that a court determine by order "[a]s soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action" whether a suit can
be maintained as a class action. 24  Early certification by itself, how-
ever, does not ensure that putative class members will not opt out
after judgment. Thus, subdivision (c)(2) requires that the court direct
notice to (b)(3) class members and specify the date beyond which they
may not opt out. 25 Like subdivision (c)(1), subdivision (c)(2) does not
prescribe the order in which notice and judgment on the merits is to
be determined. The same ambiguity exists in subdivision (c)(3),
which directs the court when it enters judgment only to "specify or
describe" those to whom (c)(2) notice was sent and who have been
designated as class members.2 6
19 See notes 78-82 and accompanying text infra. Mutuality of estoppel is the doctrine
whereby "[n]o party is . . . bound in a subsequent proceeding by a judgment, unless the
adverse party now seeking to secure the benefit of the former adjudication would have been
prejudiced by it if it had been determined the other way." 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 159
(4th ed. 1892). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
20 See notes 89-93 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 83-88 and accompanying text infra. Under the 1938 rule, a defendant's verdict
precluded cost-sharing altogether by eliminating the incentive to intervene.
22 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 106.
23 See, e.g., cases cited in note 138 infra.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Because subdivision (c)(1) does not explictly state when
certification must occur, some district courts have adopted local rules to require certification
within a certain number of days. See, e.g., D.D.C. LOCAL Civ. R. 1-13(b); S.D.N.Y. LOCAL
Civ. R. 4(c). Such a rule would not by itself prevent one-way intervention, however, if a
motion to decide the merits were disposed of before the specified time had elapsed. Even where
no specific time limitation applies, the time necessary for a merits determination may be
shorter than the period specified by "as soon as practicable."
s See note 17 supra.
26 (3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
1222 [Vol. 66:1218
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B. The Supreme Court: 1973 Term
Following the 1966 amendment, discussion concerning class cer-
tification timing centered on the meaning of "[a]s soon as practica-
ble" in subdivision (c)(1).2 7  Several courts read the new rule to
require a "prompt" certification order, 28 but the desirability of flexi-
bility in timing was also recognized.29  The Supreme Court shifted
the debate in 1974, however, when it employed strong language in
two cases to suggest that one-way intervention is impermissible under
the new rule.
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,a0 the district court had
ruled that the plaintiff's alleged (b)(3) class action could not be main-
tained and had denied subsequent attempts by putative class members
to intervene because the statute of limitations had run.31 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal as to the issue of
intervention, holding that "the filing of a timely class action com-
plaint commences the action for all members of the class as subse-
quently determined" now that the (b)(3) action, unlike the former
spurious action, is a "truly representative suit." '3 2  The Court also
suggested in dictum that the Rules Advisory Committee had ap-
proved the provision in the new rule binding absent members to an
adverse judgment only after proscribing one-way intervention.33
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in
subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(c)(3).
27 See Frankel, supra note 15, at 39-42.
28 E.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
29 See Frankel, supra note 15, at 41-42.
30 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
31 See Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99 (C.D. Ca. 1970); Utah v.
American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Ca. 1969).
32 414 U.S. at 550 (emphasis added). The Court did not clarify whether its holding
depended on the 1966 amendment; it did acknowledge that the statute of limitations issue had
not reached the Supreme Court prior to 1966. Id. Under the old rule, "[a] majority of the
courts ruling on the question, emphasizing the representative nature of a class suit, concluded
that such intervention was proper." Id. at 549 (citations omitted).
33 According to the Court, "[t]he 1966 amendments were designed, in part, specifically to
mend this perceived defect in the former Rule [of permitting one-way intervention] and to
assure that members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be
bound by all subsequent orders and judgments." Id. at 547. On the other hand, the Court did
not consider whether it would have held that a representative class action device that permitted
one-way intervention would toll the statute for individual members. Thus, it cannot be deter-
mined whether the one-way intervention aspect of the new rule was even relevant to the
Court's holding. See text accompanying note 148 infra.
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The Supreme Court later confronted the one-way intervention
issue more directly in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin.34 The district court
in Eisen had conducted a precertification "mini-hearing" to assess the
merits informally in order to apportion costs of class notice between
the parties. 35  The Supreme Court invalidated the hearing 36 on the
ground that it "contravene[d] the Rule by allowing a representative
plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying
the requirements for it [, which is] ... directly contrary to the
command of subdivision (c)(1) [of rule 23]." 3' The Court's opinion
is ambiguous as to whether the mini-hearing, by delaying the certifi-
cation decision, merely violated subdivision (c)(1)'s command to cer-
tify" [a]s soon as practicable," or whether the procedure also violated
an implied command in (c)(1) against one-way intervention. 38 In any
event, some lower courts have interpreted Eisen, as well as American
Pipe, as disapproving one-way intervention and, hence, postjudgment
certification. 39
34 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
'3 Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
36 The Court also held that rule 23 requires that the plaintiff bear the costs of individual
notice to class members who can be identified through reasonable effort. 417 U.S. at 172-79. In
holding that individual notice is mandatory, the Court, echoing its earlier language in American
Pipe, stated that the "unambiguous requirement of Rule 23. . . was intended to insure that the
judgment, whether favorable or not, would bind all class members who did not request
exclusion from the suit." Id. at 176.
37 Id. at 177-78. The Court also raised two secondary objections to the mini-hearing. First,
"nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits .. " Id. at 177. See also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973) (arguing absence of provision in rules for
mini-hearing). Second, the Court noted that a mini-hearing "is not accompanied by the
traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials [, which could] result in substantial
prejudice to a defendant." Id. at 178. Lower courts, however, have deemphasized the signifi-
cance of Eisen's procedural objection. See, e.g., Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353
& n.2 (7th Cir. 1975). But cf. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 805 (W.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (precertification
summary judgment distinguished from Eisen mini-hearing on ground that summary judgment
offers procedural protections found wanting in mini-hearing).
38 The Court seems to have relied more heavily on the "as soon as practicable" require-
ment, presumably believing that any consideration of a merits motion would have required
more time than was permitted by subdivision (c)(1). 417 U.S. at 178. See notes 95-100 & 149-50
and accompanying text infra.
39 It has been argued that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp.,
523 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1975) (certification impermissible even after summary judgment despite
its procedural safeguards, see note 37 supra) suggests that "Eisen is being interpreted as a case
about one-way intervention." Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318,
1425 n. 193 [hereinafter cited as Developments-Class Actions]. In addition, the Peritz court, citing
American Pipe, argued that "[t]he obvious import of [the Court's] language is that the amended
Rule 23 requires class certification prior to a determination on the merits." 523 F.2d at 353
(emphasis in original). See also Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270,
273-75 (10th Cir. 1977). Cf Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 354 & n.14
1224
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II
EROSION OF THE RULE AGAINST ONE-WAY INTERVENTION
A. Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) Actions
Courts in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions after American Pipe and Eisen
rejected the Supreme Court's implied prohibition against one-way
intervention. Limiting the rule against one-way intervention to (b)(3)
actions,40 courts in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions concluded that delay in
the (c)(1) certification order until after judgment did not extinguish
their power to certify a class. Instead they sought to determine case-
by-case whether it would be reversible error to grant postjudgment
relief.4 ' It is difficult, however, to acertain the basis upon which the
courts determined that the language in rule 23 distinguishes (b)(3)
actions from non-(b)(3) actions for purposes of one-way interven-
tion.42
B. Rule 23(b)(3) Actions: Developing Exceptions
1. Waiver
In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,43 the Third Circuit effectively
proposed a type of postjudgment certification in a (b)(3) class action
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (relying only on Rules Advisory Committee "intention" to
preclude one-way intervention, see note 22 and accompanying text supra, rather than on Eisen
or American Pipe). For pre-Eisen cases disapproving postjudgment certification, see Miller v.
Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427-30 (5th Cir. 1971) (consideration of merits before
deciding certification request improper); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 595 (D.
Minn. 1973) (summary judgment postponed until after class determination where "notice
problems . . . do not seem particularly awesome").
40 See, e.g., Larionoffv. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ((b)(1)
action), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698, 700 & n.25
(7th Cir. 1975). ((b)(2) action), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). See also cases cited at notes
143, 159 infra.
41 E.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d at 699.
42 See Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d at 1182-83 (relying in part on "express"
language of subdivision (c)(2) to distinguish (b)(3) actions); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d
at 697 (relying in part on inference of language of rule 23 to distinguish (b)(3) actions).
Subdivision (c)(2), cited by the Larionoff court, may assume that (b)(3) class notice is sent prior
to judgment, but the rule nowhere specifies that the certification order itself in such actions
should be treated differently than it is in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions.
Under the Larionoff andJimenez view, plaintiffs' attorneys may be able to avoid the Eisen
prejudgment certification requirement merely by adding to their class allegations a prayer for
injunctive relief. The action may then qualify for (b)(2) prosecution under more relaxed
certification procedural requirements. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1775 (1972); Note, Notice in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief. Johnson
v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1236 (1980) (criticizing Fifth Circuit for
subjecting (b)(2) plaintiffs seeking monetary relief to an "onerous" (b)(3) procedure by
imposing mandatory individual notice requirements); note 168 infra.
43 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
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by permitting a "test case." The court suggested that the class plain-
tiff litigate his claim individually against the defendant, who would
"waive" the protection of the rule against one-way intervention and
agree to be bound by an adverse judgment after subsequent class
certification. 44  Concluding that the "as soon as practicable [require-
ment of subdivision (c)(1)] does not necessarily mean at the outset of
the lawsuit," 45 the court found prejudgment certification both unnec-
essary and undesirable where neither party would be affected ad-
versely by postjudgment certification, 46 and where prejudgment no-
tice otherwise would have damaged the defendant's business. 47  The
Katz court justified this test case exception to the rule against one-way
intervention on the ground that a recent Supreme Court decision had
relaxed the requirement of mutuality of estoppel. 48
Commentators predicted that Katz would have limited impact,
arguing that it is unusual for a defendant to wish to avoid early certifica-
tion and notice. 49 Two circumstances in Katz supported this view.
First, the defendant expressly agreed to postjudgment certification,
and the court suggested that there would have been a different result
44 A test case, although sometimes identified as a form of postjudgment certification, see
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 701 & n.27 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976), differs in one important respect: Because the test case procedure in Katz arose before
judgment, the court lacked the power to require the defendant to submit to certification. The
Katz court suggested that plaintiff could "condition[] postponement of notice upon the filing of
an appropriate stipulation by the defendant agreeing to be bound in favor of potential class
members by an adverse determination of liability." 496 F.2d at 760 n.7. See also id. at 758-62.
45 496 F.2d at 758.
40 Id.
47 The defendant was concerned that certification would result in class notice that would
cause its credit card holders to withhold payments, a result "possibly catastrophic to [the
defendant]." Id. at 757. Furthermore, the defendant argued that certification would require it
to file compulsory counterclaims for past due accounts against those who did not opt out upon
receiving notice. According to the court's description of the defendant's position, "[t]his course
• . . would be disruptive of its normal collection practices and of its relations with its account
debtors." Id. at 758.
48 Id. at 759-60 (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation,
402 U.S. 313 (1971)). See notes 78-82 and accompanying text infra.
11 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.50, at 428 & n.32 (2d ed. 1981); Becker, The Class
Action Conflict: A 1976 Report, in Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District
Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89, 173 (1978) (Katz procedure will be "suggested by and agreeable to a
defendant" only "in very exceptional circumstances"); 88 HARV. L. REv. 825, 834 (1975)
("Because a defendant will consent to a test-case procedure only in rare instances, and because
that procedure appears to be inappropriate without such consent, the effect of Katz on class
litigation is likely to be extremely limited"); 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1195, 1207 (1975). Cf
Izaguirre v. Tankersley, 516 F. Supp. 755 (D. Or. 1981) (class certification conducted simulta-
neously with partial summary judgment for defendants held permissible where they waive
"protection" of rule against one-way intervention).
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in the absence of such agreement.5 ° The second circumstance arises
out of Katz's subsequent history. The Third Circuit denied certifica-
tion and held in favor of a test case on the ground that a class action
was not superior to the test case as required by subdivision (b)(3). 51
Although the circuit court apparently anticipated certification once
the test case resulted in a plaintiffs verdict, 52 the district court refused
to certify a class on remand, and required instead that each individual
plaintiff bring his own action. 53  Thus, the district court rendered
permanent the Third Circuit's temporary determination that a class
action was not superior.
Since Katz, courts have used both the "express waiver" and
"superiority" limitations to deny plaintiffs the option of a test case
and/or postjudgment certification. 54  Not all courts, however, have
50 [I]t must be understood that we are dealing only with the defendant who declines
the protection against one-way intervention after a violation has been proved which
rule 23(b)(3) was designed to afford. If a class action defendant insists upon early
class action determination and notice, he is, under the rule, entitled to it.
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d at 762.
Recent case law suggests the possibility of a new type of express waiver by the defendant.
In Izaguirre v. Tankersley, 516 F. Supp. 755 (D. Or. 1981), the court permitted class
certification simultaneous with partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Arguing
that the rule against one-way intervention "is intended to protect the defendant," id. at 757, it
noted, curiously, that the defendant can "waive that protection and attempt to obtain a
favorable decision which is not binding on the potential class members who were not afforded
the opportunity to opt in or out of the class." Id. Though the precise meaning of the latter
point is unclear in light of its decision to pennit certification, Izaguirre seems to suggest a new
view of the defendant's power to certify postjudgment when it is in his interest to do so.
-" Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d at 760.
52 It has been suggested that Katz was ambiguous as to the court's intention to grant
postjudgment certification, see 88 HARV. L. REy. 825, 827 n. 12, 834 n.53 (1975), but the court
clearly contemplated "postponement of [the class action] issues until violation [could be]
decided." 496 F.2d at 760. See also id. at 762 n.8.
s' The district court apparently was influenced by the implied prohibition against one-way
intervention in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 88 HARV. L. REv. 825, 834
n.53 (1975).
m For example, in a closely related action involving the same defendant, the district court
rejected consideration of plaintiff's pending summary judgment motion until after the (c)(1)
determination on the ground that Carte Blanche Corporation had not expressly waived its
rights:
Plaintiff has briefed the merits of [his summary judgment] motion; defendant has
briefed only its position that the motion is not ripe for determination until after a
decision on the class certification question-a position to which I adhere and which
plaintiff does not appear to challenge in the absence of an express waiver by defendant of
its rights to enjoyment of the benefits of mutality of estoppel and to protection
against 'one-way intervention.' See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.
Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 76 F.R.D. 199, 200 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (emphasis added).
For other cases denying a test case procedure on the ground that the defendant had not
expressly waived rule 23, see Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 70 F.R.D. 608, 613 n.6 (D. Minn.
1976); Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
((b)(2) action), aff'd, 533 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); Sommers v.
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read Katz so narrowly. For example, Katz's waiver analysis has been
applied in cases in which the defendant has moved for summary
judgment, so that the defendant is prevented from requesting class
certification after a judgment has been entered in his favor. 55 Some
courts have gone further by suggesting that the defendant's summary
judgment motion also constitutes a waiver of his right to object to
postjudgment certification if the plaintiff moved simultaneously for
summary judgment and was successful.5 6  One court even has applied
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581, 592 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Connor
v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, 68 F.R.D. 370, 372-73 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (mere objection
by defendant sufficient to defeat proposed test case procedure). Cf. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank,
71 F.R.D. 334, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (refusal to decertify class that was notified postjudgment
because defendant had expressly agreed to test case procedure), rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.2d
188 (7th Cir. 1979). One commenator has suggested that the test case procedure should not be
invoked unless the defendant can also demonstrate that he will suffer "great harm" from
prejudgment notice. 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1195, 1206 n.58 (1975).
A number of courts have implied that the test case alternative, combined with offensive
issue preclusion by class members in individual actions, renders the class action an inferior
device even after judgment. See, e.g., Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d
277, 290 (3d Cir. 1978) (alternative holding); Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d
59, 69 & n.32 (4th Cir. 1977) (contemplation of future individual actions invoking collateral
estoppel), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 78
F.R.D. 709, 720 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 60, 69
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 612 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc); Boring v. Medusa
Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 83-85 (M.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.
1974); Rappaport v. Katz, 62 F.R.D. 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Commentators have also suggested that Eisen casts doubt on a court's power to certify
following a test case. See 88 HARv. L. REv. 825, 832-33 (1975); Developments-Class Actions,
supra note 39, at 1425.
5 See, e.g., Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 802-06 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (postponement of class
notification permitted until after consideration of cross motions for summary judgment). The
Haas court suggested that "[t]he defendants, by moving for summary judgment prior to the
sending out of class notice, thereby assume the risk that a judgment in their favor will not
protect them from subsequent suits by other potential class members .. " Id. at 806. Unlike
Katz, the court did not suggest that the defendant had expressly agreed to be bound to the class.
In fact, the defendant appears to have opposed the precertification merits determination. Id. at
802. Torosian v. National Capital Bank, 411 F. Supp. 167, 169-70 (D.D.C. 1976) failed to cite
Katz, but did rely on Haas for the proposition that the defendant's summary judgment motion
constituted an "assumption of the risk" that a defendant's victory on the merits would not
bind the class. The Torosian defendant had "explicitly acknowledged this principal [sic]." Id. at
170 & n.11. In Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1380-84 (1980)
(dictum), the District of Columbia Circuit, citing Katz, suggested that a defendant's successful
summary judgment motion would have constituted a waiver on his part of postjudgment
certification. As in Haas, the court did not state that the defendant had expressly agreed to
proceed with the merits before certification. But see Izaguirre v. Tankersley, 516 F. Supp. 755
(D. Or. 1981) (successful motion for partial summary judgment by defendant held not to
preclude simultaneous class certification motion by defendant because rule against one-way
intervention intended only to protect defendant).
56 E.g., Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Torosian v. National Capital Bank, 411 F. Supp. 167, 170 & n.12 (D.D.C. 1976).(dictum);
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such waiver where the plaintiff moved successfully for summary judg-
ment after the defendant's motion was decided. 57
2. Postjudgment Appeal
A second exception to the rule against one-way intervention
involves cases in which an appellate court permits postjudgment certi-
fication sub silentio by reversing, after a decision on the merits, a trial
court's order denying certification. Appellate courts historically have
been reluctant to foreclose the right of an interested party to intervene
in order to appeal, although a judgment has been entered below. 58
Because the Supreme Court recently declared that a plaintiff may not
appeal as a matter of right an order denying class certification prior to
judgment, 5 sometimes the only opportunity for appeal of a (c)(1)
order is postjudgment. In fact, the Supreme Court in United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald8" held that a member of the putative class could
intervene postjudgment to appeal a denial of certification. Similarly,
Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (dictum), aff'd in part
and rev'd inpart on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). Unlike the defendant in Katz, the
defendant in Postow neither argued that prejudgment certification would disrupt its business
nor expressed its willingness to be bound by a plaintiff's judgment. Instead, it vigorously
opposed efforts to certify the class on appeal. In fact, the defendant's motion to delay discovery
on the plaintiff class pending the defendant's summary judgment motion, 627 F.2d at 1383
n.30, was its only affirmative act-hardly evidence of a desire to submit to a class judgment.
5' Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1382, 1383-84 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Thus, the defendant in Postow may have been unaware of the possibility of a precertifi-
cation decision in favor of the plaintiff at the time he made his own summary judgment motion.
Consequently, according to the D.C. Circuit, waiver may apply to precertification merits
motions regardless of which party makes them or their outcomes.
58 See, e.g., Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th
Cir. 1953); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3
F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
," Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). Until Livesay, circuit courts were
divided over whether the "death knell" doctrine, under which an order denying class certifica-
tion would be appealable as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, applied to class actions.
Id. at 465 & n.2.
Before judgment on the merits, the plaintiff does have an opportunity to request discre-
tionary interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). According to one commentator,
however, § 1292(b) is a "limited" remedy because simultaneous approval by both the trial and
appellate courts requires that "exceptional circumstances exist to justify a departure from the
final order rule." 11 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & Paoc. 635, 656 n.92 (1978). In Link v. Mercedes-
Benz, Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 863 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977), the Third Circuit
warned that trial courts "should not certify for § 1292(b) consideration without stating persua-
sive reasons why the particular class action question is so unusual as to demand the interven-
tion of an appellate court." But see note 162 infra.
60 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1218
in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,61 the Court held that settle-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs did not preclude appeal of a (c)(1) order
against the class. By implicitly contemplating certification after an
initial judgment on the merits,6 2 both McDonald and Roper cast doubt
upon the Eisen/American Pipe rule against one-way intervention. Al-
though the Court's failure in McDonald and Roper to address its earlier
one-way intervention decisions6" beclouds its stance on one-way inter-
vention, lower courts have viewed these recent cases as signaling an
attenuation of the rule against one-way intervention. 64
3. Amendment of Class Notice
The District of Columbia Circuit's recent decision in Postow v.
OBA Federal Savings & Loan Association65 suggests a third equitable
exception to the rule against one-way intervention in 23(b)(3) actions.
In Postow, the court permitted (b)(3) class certification following sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Relying on Katz, the court
concluded that the defendant had waived the "protection" of prejudg-
ment certification by moving for summary judgment. 66  Further-
more, the court identified two other "equitable" grounds for its
decision. First, the postjudgment notice sent to class members had not
61 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
62 In neither McDonald nor Roper did the subsequent class certification result in immediate
recovery, as there remained outstanding class issues that were not resolved in the initial
judgment. See, e.g., McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1978). In such
cases, one-way intervention technically does not occur. See Cohen, "Not Dead But Only Sleep-
ing": The Reection of the Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59
B.U. L. REv. 257, 280 (1979) (new trial for class necessary following reversal of trial court
order against certification). The initial judgment in favor of the named plaintiff, however, is
likely to influence significantly both the litigation strategy and the actions of those who must
later decide whether to opt out. And as in the test case in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496
F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974), and the mini-hearing in Eisen, the
McDonald/Roper procedure discourages early class intervention and creates the same "im-
balance" referred to by those who sought to preclude one-way intervention in the 1966
amendment to rule 23. 445 U.S. at 354.
63 Only Justice Powell, in dissent, mentioned that certification on remand following a
judgment for the named plaintiff raises problems of one-way intervention. 445 U.S. at 354 &
n.14; 432 U.S. at 401 n.4 (by implication). See notes 125-28 and accompanying text infra.
64 For example, in Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1382-83
(1980), the District of Columbia Circuit seized upon McDonald and Roper to support postjudg-
ment certification of a (b)(3) action. Other courts may follow in light of the fact that courts
considering postjudgment certification in class actions before 1977 noted other circuit court sub
silentio appeals cases similar to McDonald and Roper to justify one-way intervention. See, e.g.,
Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (noting Partain
v. First Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 65 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972),
class certified on remand, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973)).
65 627 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
66 Id. at 1382. Cf notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
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informed them of the plaintiffs judgment. The court concluded
that this procedure "reduc[ed] substantially the 'one way street' dan-
ger of post-judgment .certifications." 8 Second, the trial judge had,
inter alia, certified the class prior to the plaintiff's summary judgment
motion but subsequently vacated certification pending appeal.6 9 Ac-
cording to the circuit court, this "unique sequence of. . . proceedings
in the court below" 7 0 also supported class certification.
Time will tell whether other courts will adopt and expand Pos-
tow's new exceptions. Notwithstanding the circuit court's attempt to
limit its holding to the facts of the case,71 judicial impatience with the
rule against one-way intervention suggests that Postow may represent
another significant step in the erosion of the rule.
III
A REEXAMINATION OF ONE-WAY INTERVENTION
The willingness of some courts to find equitable grounds to avoid
the rule against one-way intervention raises doubts about the merits of
retaining it at all. It seems disturbing, for example, that a plaintiff
need only add to his complaint a request for injunctive relief in order
to avoid the procedural requirements of subdivision (b)(3) and, hence,
the one-way intervention rule. No apparent reason has been suggested
to explain why such actions should be treated differently from those
that do not pray for an equitable remedy.72 This section analyzes the
traditional justifications for banning one-way intervention and dis-
cusses the costs that such a rule imposes on plaintiffs and defendants
as well as its effects on judicial efficiency. It then criticizes current
judicial attempts to fashion equitable exceptions to alleviate the hard-
ship caused by the rule.
A. Traditional Justifications
The 1966 Advisory Committee's Note accompanying the pro-
posed amendments to rule 23 did not articulate the Committee's
reasons for disfavoring one-way intervention, but only referred to the
67 627 F.2d at 1382.
.8 Id. at 1383.
69 Id. at 1383 n.30. The court did not approve notice to class members until after the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and subsequent recertification. Id.
70 Id. at 1381.
71 See id. at 1381, 1383-84.
71 See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
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"conflicting views" 7 3 6n the issue. Proponents of the rule prohibiting
one-way intervention have, however, offered four arguments in sup-
port of their position.
1. Equalizing Risk Exposure
According to then-Judge John Paul Stevens, "[a] procedure
which permits a claim to be treated as a class action if plaintiff wins,
but merely as an individual claim if plaintiff loses, is strikingly un-
fair." 7 4  Underlying this idea is the apparent inequity of allowing a
class member to benefit from a favorable judgment without having
undertaken the burdens and risks of litigation. "As with William
James' cocktail," one commentator analogized, "he must take the
bitter with the sweet-or else not drink any of it." 75  This argument
falsely assumes, however, that legal rights should not be vindicated in
the absence of the danger of losing. The judicial system does not
operate in a gambling paradigm. 76  Kalven and Rosenfeld, cham-
pions of postjudgment "participation in the decree," dismissed the
argument in the following way:
[Plolicy considerations . . . virtually compel the construction [of
the former class action rule] that participation by absentee mem-
bers is permitted after the decree. That this must be so is evident if
the real argument of the defendant is made explicit. The court has
just decided that the defendant is liable to those in the same legal
position as the plaintiff. The defendant in resisting participation
must contend not that he is not liable to the others, but that each
must endure the normal inconvenience of litigation, that each must
harass him with a separate suit, and ultimately, that justice has
been made too quick, too convenient, too exact, and too com-
plete. 77
2. Consistency with Mutuality of Estoppel
Until recently, the leading rationale for prohibiting postjudgment
certification was that permitting a nonparty to the original proceeding
7' Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 105. See also Developments-Class Actions, supra
note 39, at 1395 ("The reasons the rulemakers opposed one-way intervention are not dear.").
The Committee implied that one-way intervention violates mutuality of estoppel, observing
that a postjudgment intervenor "would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable deci-
sion." Advisory Committee Notes, supra, at 105.
14 Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1207 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUiTY 280 (1950).
71 See Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684,
713 (1941). In fact, it may be no less "unfair" for an absentee to sue individually following the
first action and garner the benefit of hindsight. Id.
71 Id. at 701 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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to intervene after the court enters judgment against the defendant
contravenes the mutuality of estoppel doctrine.7 8  The demise of
mutuality,79 however, undermines the foundation of a per se require-
ment of prejudgment certification. Despite the growing use of issue
preclusion by nonparties in a class action context,80 there remains a
reluctance to acknowledge that the dramatic changes in res judicata
law wholly recast class action procedural issues. Perhaps the intent of
the 1966 revisions was to inhibit one-way intervention, but the deeper
purpose was'to bring class action procedure into line with res judicata
law."' Ironically, a per se requirement of prejudgment certification
today sometimes achieves the opposite result by denying class litigants
the benefit of a favorable judgment that 'they otherwise might have
enjoyed under the modern law of issue preclusion .2
78 See note 19 and accompanying text supra. "The literature on the development of rule
23(b)(3) makes it quite clear that the early notice requirement was directly related to dissatis-
faction with the lack of mutuality of the estoppel which resulted from [permitting intervention
by plaintiffs after the defendant's liability had been determined]." Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). See also Kaplan, supra note
8, at 385-86.
71 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OFJUDOMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29] [Throughout this Note, the
corresponding section numbers that will appear in the final Restatement Second are given in
brackets after citation to the tenative drafts.]; Holland, Modernizing ResJudicata: Reflections on the
Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615 (1980); Kadue & Callen, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It:
An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 755 (1980);
Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL
L. REv. 1002 (1979). Although practice prior to Parklane was to draw a distinction between
offensive and defensive assertion of issue preclusion by a nonparty, see, e.g., Currie, Mutality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957), assertion of
preclusion now depends on the discretion of the trial judge. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. at 331 & n.16; Holland, supra, at 631-33.
so See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir.) (suggesting that recent
approval by the Supreme Court of issue preclusion by a nonparty "requires that a new look be
taken at the alternative of a test case in lieu of an early class action determination"), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974); cases cited in note 54 supra (holding that availability of issue preclusion to
putative class members renders class action inferior device under-rule 23(b)(3)); Holland, supra
note 79, at 634-38. See also Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92
HARv. L. REv. 718, 736-37 (1979).
81 See generally Developments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1394-1402.
82 If the plaintiff does not request or fails to obtain class certification and seeks only
individual relief, a subsequent action by a second plaintiff against the same defendant may
establish de facto class certification: If the second plaintiff succeeds in invoking issue preclusion
as to substantive issues from the first action, the determination that issue preclusion applies
may be res judicata in the third and subsequent actions by other plaintiffs. See George, Sweet
Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REv. 655, 659 &
n.32 (1980).
Few courts have actually held that postjudgment certification is permissible on the ground
that mutality is no longer required. SeeJimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 701 (7th Cir.
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3. Shared Burden of Litigation
Professor Chafee suggested that the rule against one-way inter-
vention forces class plaintiffs to enter the action earlier, thus helping
the named plaintiff to undertake the costs of litigation by making
available class support and financial assistance. 83  Permitting the pu-
tative class member to remain on the sidelines until judgment, the
argument goes, increases the likelihood that he will not contribute to
expenses if the plaintiff loses. 4
Although litigation costs may be a legitimate concern, rule 23
was not structured to address this problem. A plaintiffs judgment
may apportion costs by reducing the award pro rata among class
recipients,85 but the rule does not provide for collection of expenses in
the event of a judgment against the class.8 " Moreover, the prolifera-
tion of contingency fee arrangements as well as statutory provisions
under which a plaintiff may avoid attorney's fees8 7 diminishes the
need for a procedural mechanism to govern the apportionment of
litigation expenses. 88
4. Protection of the Defendant's Reliance Interest
Defendants have come to perceive the certification decision as a
critical stage in (b)(3) litigation.89  Because postjudgment certification
1975) ((b)(2) action), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). Cf Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (permitting postjudgment certification without raising
mutuality issue). Courts that have in the past attempted to apply modern res judicata law to
class action procedure have been criticized. For example, commentators reacted to Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) with criticism of,
inter alia, its reliance on the Supreme Court's disapproval of mutuality in Blonder-Tongue, see
note 48 and accompanying text supra. See 88 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1975); 21 WAYNE L. REv.
1195 (1975). Of course, at the time the Third Circuit heard Katz, the Supreme Court had not
yet decided Parklane Hosiery Co., which expanded significantly Blonder-Tongue's approval of the
use of issue preclusion by non-parties.
83 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 75, at 278-79.
84 Id. at 278.
85 See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (discussing whether
precertification plaintiffs judgment moots class allegations for purposes of appeal, taking into
consideration plaintiff's incentive to spread costs among class members).
88 Courts have actually restricted communication between the plaintiff's attorney and the
class in matters involving solicitation of fees and expenses. Developments-Class Actions, supra
note 39, at 1597 & n.81. See also Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 49 F.R.D. 217,
229-30 (1970).
87 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976) (recovery of attorney's fees in Truth-in-Lending
action).
88 In addition to spreading litigation costs, prejudgment notice may encourage early
intervention by putative class members, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(C), but the thrust of this
requirement is to determine the adequacy of the named plaintiff's representation. Of course,
by the time notice is sent, this determination already has been made.
8 According to Professor Miller, "certification often is critical to the viability of the
suit .... Once the case is certified as a class action, the size of the potential liability takes on a
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may increase dramatically the defendant's liability, early certification
affords class opponents some protection from unfair surprise. In cer-
tain cases, an early certification decision may be important to the class
opponent in providing notice of potential liability9" and in devising
defense and settlement tactics. 1 If the class is certified late in the
action, the class opponent may discover that he has relied 'to his
detriment on the nonclass character of the action.
A per se prohibition of one-way intervention to protect the class
opponent's reliance interest, however, is overbroad. Courts have per-
mitted postjudgment certification in rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions,
recognizing that parties sometimes proceed on the assumption that the
action will become a class action. 92  In such situations, the class
defendant will assert the same defenses and litigate as vigorously
frightening dimension. .. ." Miller, supra note 5, at 679 n.63. See also A. MILLER, AN
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 12 (1977); SENATE COM-
MERCE COMMITTEE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CLASS ACTION STUDY 12-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as CLASS ACTION STUDY] [substantially reprinted at 62 GEo. L.J. 1123 (1974), but without the
Senate Committee's comments on predicted impact of Eisen on post-1974 class action practice];
Berry, supra note 5, at 300 & n.8.
'0 See Note, Title VII and Postjudgment Class Actions, 47 IND. LJ. 350, 364 (1972). An early
certification decision will also affect putative class members who, relying on the existence of a
class action, may suspend prosecution of individual actions against the class opponent. If the
court delays the (c)(1) order long enough and eventually denies certification, the statute of
limitations may prevent the filing of individual claims. See Frankel, supra note 15, at 42
(warning against delayed amendment of certification order under second sentence of subdivi-
sion 23(c)(1)). The Court in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974),
discussed at notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra, protected subsequent individual actions
by holding that the named plaintiffs' filing of a class action suspends the limitations period for
all putative class members. There remains, however, some judicial confusion about the Ameri-
can Pipe rule. For example, it is unclear when and under what circumstances class members
may receive extensions of the statute of limitations when needed. Moreover, there is disagree-
ment as to whether a class member must intervene in the action after a denial of certification,
or whether he may file a separate action. See Comment, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations,
48 U. CHI. L. REv. 106 (1981) (arguing for extension rather than mere suspension of statute of
limitations, but also advocating a post-denial intervention requirement). See generally Develop-
ments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1448-54; Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal
Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011,
1084-95 (1980). Thus, while the American Pipe rule grants putative class members some.
protection, early certification is still desirable to protect class claims in the event that certifica-
tion eventually is denied.
91 See A. MILLER, supra note 89, at 12 ("Defense lawyers believe that their ability to settle
the case advantageously or to convince the plaintiff to abandon the case'depends on blocking
certification."); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15-17
(1972); Frankel, supra note 15, at 42; Developments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1536-76;
Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1292
(1970); Note, Appealability of Class Action Determinations, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 548, 577-78
(1975); 40 OHIO ST. LJ. 441, 443-44 (1979).
92 See cases cited at note 159 infra.
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regardless of when certification occurs. Although in certain cases the
existence of a judgment may be relevant in gauging the damage to the
defendant's reliance interest, an inquiry that rests solely on whether
certification was before or after judgment is misguided .93  A more
appropriate inquiry would focus on whether delay in. certification has
affected the defendant's substantive defenses or strategy so adversely
as to render certification undesirable. Courts should deny certification
on such grounds only if the delay sufficiently has prejudiced the
defendant. Thus, although prejudice to the defendant is a legitimate
concern of class action practice, a more accurate approach to certifica-
tion timing questions is warranted.
B. Costs of Prohibiting One- Way Intervention
Recognizing that procedural complexities are inherent in the
management of class actions, the 1966 Advisory Committee granted
trial judges broad discretion in such litigation. 94  Its intention to
exclude one-way intervention and deprive trial judges of discretion to
certify after judgment therefore represents an aberration in the overall
scheme of rule 23. In addition, the disadvantages that stem from the
Committee's desire to determine in advance the order of certification
and judgment underscore the wisdom of judicial flexibility.
The Committee's position on one-way intervention was based in
part on the erroneous premise that the certification decision always
93 For example, in a (b)(3) action, a class defendant may have a particular need to know
who may opt out before presenting substantive defenses if he wishes to press different defenses
against different opponents. Subdivision 23(d) already may be available, however, to protect
the defendant in such situations by providing for the establishment of subclasses. Moreover, if
different subclasses present different problems for the defendant, at letst 'part of the class may
be ineligible for certification on the grounds that the named plaintiff does not represent the
class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) & 23(b)(3)(A).
The defendant may also argue that prejudgment certification is necessary to predict the
extent of liability exposure. Prejudgment certification often fails to guarantee such a benefit for
a defendant who faces a large class, however, because subdivision 23(c)(2) does not require the
identification of class members who cannot "be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
'4 For example, discretionary power is granted in: the class action prerequisite provision of
subdivision 23(a); the predominance and superiority requirements of subdivision (b)(3); the
open-ended "practicable" standard of subdivision (c)(1); and subdivision 23(d), which grants
discretion in controlling presentation of evidence, notice and class communication, interven-
tion, pleadings, and "similar procedural matters," with orders "altered or amended as may be
desirable from time to time." For a criticism of the scope of such discretionary power, see
Justice Black's'dissent to the Supreme Court's adoption of the 1966 amendments. Order of
Feb. 28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1031, 1035. Responding to Justice Black, Professor Kaplan argued
that, even in the short time following adoption of the new rules, "the courts have prevailingly
shown good understanding in spelling out and applying the delimiting criteria [of rule 23]."
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 395. See also id. at 395 n.151.
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requires less time than a decision on the merits. Although early case
law called for a "prompt" certification decision,9 5 actual practice
suggests a different picture. According to a 1974 study, 98 parties often
delay certification requests from one month to three years after filing
suit, and final court orders require an additional month to four
years.9 7 Because a court often cannot make an informed (c)(1) deter-
mination from the pleadings alone, further factual investigation and
even discovery may be necessary to appraise the nature and scope of
the class. 8 Added delays may result from the trial judge's desire to
investigate informally the merits of the plaintiffs case.99  The Com-
mittee's failure to foresee such delays, combined with a requirement
that rigidly preorders certification and judgment, has not only pro-
moted judicial inefficiency, but has caused hardship for both plaintiffs
and defendants as well.' 00
1. Costs to Plaintiffs
When confronted with a summary judgment motion 101 or motion
to dismiss,10 2 a court may feel pressured to make a hasty certification
95 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
"o CLAss ACTION STUDY, supra note 89. The Study included all class actions filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia betweenJuly 1, 1966 and December 31, 1972. Id. at
3.
97 Id. at 13. In the majority of cases studied, the motion for certification was made within
six months. Id.
98 Id. See also Frankel, supra note 15, at 41-42.
It is difficult to assess the degree to which courts analyze class issues prior to making a
(c)(1) order for or against the class. Discovery as to class issues is common, see, e.g., Huff v.
N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973); 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.50, at
423 & n.19 (2d ed. 1981), although it is not required by the rules. Cf id. at 422 & nn.16, 17
(suggesting that class allegations should be stricken from complaint only after evidentiary
hearing). In a number of cases, courts have rendered the (c)(1) order on the basis of the
pleadings or affidavits alone. See, e.g., Johnson v. Long, 67 F.R.D. 416, 417-18 (M.D. Ala.
1975); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 336 (D. R.I. 1969).
99 Although the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
struck down the trial court's use of a full preliminary hearing on the merits as a tool for
deciding certification, see notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra; notes 149-51 and accompa-
nying text inJa, it is unlikely that a trial judge's consideration of the merits can be fully
deterred. According to one recent study, trial courts are now investigating the merits "cov-
ertly, to evade Supreme Court precedent." Berry, supra note 5, at 313. See also CLAss ACTION
STUDY, supra note 89, at 14-15; A. MILLER, supra note 89, at 15 ("[T]here is no way the judge
can make the seven findings required by Rule 23 without at least a preliminary exploration of
the merits.").
100 The discussion below of the costs imposed by the rule against one-way intervention is not
intended as an exhaustive survey of the countless permutations possible in class action practice;
rather, it is to highlight the problems likely to recur in current practice.
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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decision under subdivision (c)(1) in order to avoid one-way interven-
tion by class members. In so doing, the court will undermine the
accuracy of the certification process 10 3 and may render a determina-
tion that is subject to collateral attack. 0 4  Alternatively, if the judge
decides the merits before certifying the class, 10 5 a per se rule against
one-way intervention applied by an appellate court would deny the
class plaintiff certification and support from other class members.
10 6
Occasionally, a trial court simply will deny certification at the outset
or refuse to hear the certification motion if the court intends to rule for
the defendant. 01 If, for example, the appellate court reverses on the
merits, the plaintiff is then without a class remedy, an unfair result if
the plaintiff filed his (c)(1) motion in a timely manner but was unable
to control the court's schedule for deciding the merits.'08
103 For example, the court could overlook potential class members. Developments-Class
Actions, supra note 39, at 1422-24. An underinclusive class certification order disadvantages
neglected class members by forcing them to litigate separately, or by precluding recovery
altogether. See note 106 infra.
104 A class member who has failed to opt out and is thus bound to an unfair or adverse
judgment may attack the judgment on the grounds of inadequacy of representation by the
named plaintiff, failure by the court to take into account conflicting class and party interests, or
failure to describe adequately the class. See Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel,
43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 814, 832-38 (1975) (discussing grounds for due process attack on class
judgment). If the class judgment is overturned in subsequent proceedings, the named plaintiff
loses the financial benefit of class certification, and the defendant may be forced to relitigate
class issues.
105 Some courts are reluctant to certify and subject the defendant to notice if the merits
appear weak. See, e.g., Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(denial of certification can be effected to save parties "costs of litigation" in event that
defendant wins on the merits), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d
Cir. 1975) (dictum). Cf Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (certification
delayed to avoid disruption of defendant's business), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
106 Denying postjudgment certification could also terminate future class litigation altogether
if the named plaintiff is in a unique financial and/or legal position enabling him to prosecute
the action on behalf of the class. Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions
Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573, 587 n.60.
Individual actions by class plaintiffs may also be extremely burdensome to the class
defendant. Under certain circumstances, however, individual actions may be desirable to a
class opponent who is better able than individual plaintiffs to finance litigation costs. In such a
case, rather than litigate, the plaintiffs may settle for smaller amounts than they otherwise
would receive in class litigation, or they may choose not to prosecute their actions at all.
10' Berry, supra note 5, at 312-13 & nn.84-85. In the Senate Commerce Committee Study,
55% of pending class actions in the District of Columbia were "disposed of in favor of the
defendant on preliminary motions" prior to certification. The Study also noted that the merits
frequently were considered along with certification and notice. CLASS ACTION STUDY, supra note
89, at 9. The Study, however, did not account for distinctions between (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions
and (b)(3) actions; some courts apply different certification timing considerations to the latter
actions. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra. Further, the Study was undertaken
before Eisen, which altered lower court behavior with respect to certification questions. See
CLASS ACTION STUDY, supra, at 15; note 39 and accompanying text supra.
100 The plaintiff may be able to delay his own motion for summary judgment, but the
defendant or the court may initiate an early merits determination independent of the plaintiff's
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2. Costs to Defendants
Trial courts sometimes delay a merits determination to preserve
the certification option. To take advantage of this delay, a plaintiff
need only add class allegations to the pleadings to lock a defendant
who is anxious to avoid litigation into a lengthy certification battle. 109
Courts that have read Eisen to require a total separation of the certifi-
cation decision and the merits 1 o may conclude that they cannot even
hear a defendant's motion to dismiss before certification."'
wishes. For example, if the only contested question involves a legal issue, the defendant's
summary judgment motion may precipitate a plaintiff's judgment, because ruling against the
defendant's summary judgment motion may be tantamount to a decision on the merits for the
plaintiff. Thus, judges may view the postponement of a plaintiff's summary judgment motion
following denial of a defendant's summary judgment motion as pointless and counter to
effective management of litigation. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326
(1980) (judgment for plaintiffs entered over their objection and before they could obtain
certification); Postow v. OBA Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370, 1383 n.30 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (following denial of defendant's summary judgment motion involving legal interpreta-
tion of Truth-in-Lending Act, plaintiff's summary judgment motion on same issue granted
before giving of notice undertaken); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Postow v. OBA Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (arguing that defendant's summary
judgment motion, although unsuccessful as to Count II, "precipitat[ed] the early decision on
the merits").
Under this scenario, the per se rule against one-way intervention effectively deprives
appellate courts of the opportunity to review a denial of a (c)(1) certification request once a
merits judgment has been entered and approved on appeal. In light of the perceived signifi-
cance of a (c)(1) order, granting trial courts uncontrolled discretion seems undesirable.
109 On the other hand, if the defendant wants to bind the class to ajudgment in his favor, he
would wish to postpone the merits determination. Cf. Roberts v. American Airlines, Inc., 526
F.2d 757, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1975) (postjudgment certification denied to defendant whose motion
for summary judgment was granted before certification), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976).
Otherwise, the costs of delay to defendants include litigation expenses, uncertainty as to loss
exposure, and lack ofjudicial guidance in how to shape future conduct to avoid liability. Berry,
supra note 5, at 306. For an extreme example, see Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
11 Berry, supra note 5, at 312-14; notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
' Recent evidence of Eisen's influence on defendants' merits motions is Pruitt v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980), in which the district court, citing Eisen, refused
to consider a defendant's precertification motion to dismiss, concluding that
a determination of class certification must be made without consideration of de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the claim. Defendant's motion to dismiss requires an
inquiry into the merits of the proposed class action .... As inviting as such a
determination might be, the Court has no authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of this suit....
Id. at 104. See also CLAss ACTION STUDY, supra note 89, at 15 (noting probable adverse impact
on motions to dismiss caused by Eisen).
On the other hand, hearing a defendant's motion to dismiss may be permissible because
denial of the motion would result only in a trial, not one-way intervention. See Haas v.
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); Acker v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 373 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), modified, 512 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1975); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349
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Predetermining the sequence of certification and judgment may
also skew settlement negotiation. By naming as broad a class as
possible,1 2 the plaintiff obtains a powerful bargaining weapon if the
court accepts the class allegations in order to reach the merits.1 1 3  On
the other hand, if the court postpones judgment to improve certifica-
tion accuracy, the defendant may be forced to pay an inflated settle-
ment price to avoid the time and expense of (c)(1) litigation." 4
3. Judicial Inefficiency Costs
The largest potential waste of judicial resources occurs when a
court decides a protracted certification contest in a litigation involving
a weak claim." 5 Similarly, a court that mistakenly renders judgment
F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla.
1972). See also 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02-2, at 101 & n.45 (2d ed. 1981); CLAss
ACTION STUDY, supra note 89, at 9; Developments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1419 n. 157.
Of the cases cited above, however, only Haas was decided after Eisen. Significantly, Haas is
also the only case cited by Professor Moore to support the prosposition that courts may dispose
of weak claims prior to certification. Although arguably not fatal to Professor Moore's argu-
ment, Haas did not even involve consideration of the merits before certification: The class had
been certified before the court considered the merits, see 381 F. Supp. at 803, but notice had not
yet been sent. One might draw a distinction between certification and notice, see Eovaldi v.
First Nat'l Bank, 71 F.R.D. 334, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("[N]otification is not at the jurisdic-
tional threshold where certification is."), rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1979),
but the Haas court treated the failure to notify the same as a failure to certify.
Finally, it has been argued that a requirement that the action be certified prior to the
defendant's summary judgment motion or motion to dismiss "will have little practical impact"
if adopted by courts. Defendants will continue to attempt by motion to defeat the merits, the
argument goes, and, in effect, waive the benefit of certification, because the stare decisis effect
of a defendant's judgment may be as great as the res judicata benefit of certification. Develop-
ments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1421-22. This, however, assumes that courts are willing
to hear the motions. As Pruitt demonstrates, except in clear cases, courts that are intimidated by
Eisen and are uncertain as to how they will eventually rule on a merits motion, or are concerned
that dismissal may be reversed on appeal, will want to certify the action first to avoid
prejudicing the opportunity to certify later.
112 Plaintiffs will allege a broad class to "be sure of tolling the statute of limitations for all
whom discovery will show to be actual class members and to minimize the costs charged against
individual recoveries." Developments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1426-27 (footnote omit-
ted).
113 Unless the class sues a limited fund, the defendant's potential liability increases as class
size increases.
14 See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 761-62 (3d Cir.) (noting "additional
settlement leverage which results from the disruption or injury which may occur to a defend-
ant's business relationships regardless of the merits of the claim"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (prejudgment
notification requirement acts to plaintiff's advantage regardless of merits of claim), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); CLAss ACTION STUDY, supra note
89, at 14-15 (Eisen may increase abuse by plaintiffs of class action allegations).
115 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir.) ("[P]ostponement of [class]
issues until violation is decided will actually protect the judicial system from time and expense
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on the merits while postponing the certification hearing wastes re-
sources adjudicating a potentially relatively insignificant single claim
if the appellate court later refuses postjudgment certification. 116
Moreover, the necessity of a second, duplicative class action involving
a new named plaintiff who probably knows of the initial favorable
judgment, and who may be able to invoke issue preclusion from the
initial action, augments the inefficiency. 117
C. Equitable Avoidance of the Rule Against One- Way Intervention
Faced with the above difficulties, federal courts have allowed
postjudgment certification under limited circumstances. Instead of
challenging the outdated theoretical foundation of the rule against
one-way intervention, these courts have developed categories of equi-
which might have been wasted on them in a nonliability case."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("[A] correctly
granted judgment for the defendant would protect both the parties and the court from needless
and costly further litigation."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1983 (3d
Cir. 1975).
Even if a defendant wants to certify prejudgment to bind the class to a later judgment on
the merits for the defendant, postponing judgment may not be worth the disadvantage of
judicial delay. If the plaintiff's claim is weak, the defendant will be protected by the stare
decisis effect of his first judgment, which will probably discourage potential claimants.
n1 Such refusal may occur where an appellate court reverses a trial court's order certifying a
class after a plaintiff's judgment below, or where a trial court intended to certify on remand
following appellate reversal of a defendant's judgment on the merits. See Kalven & Rosenfeld,
supra note 76, at 684-85; Developments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1324-25. An example of
the inefficiency suggested here is Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Corp., 627 F.2d 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1980): If the plaintiffs on appeal had been denied certification under the rule
against one-way intervention, the plaintiffs and judicial system would have expended large
sums over four years of litigation for one individual recovery of perhaps $100. Id. at 1384.
17 Relitigation cannot be justified if the defendant's only concern is that certification
following a plaintiff's judgment will increase the size of the class that chooses not to opt out. So
long as the class opponent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, he should not be afforded a
second chance to litigate merely to achieve a different outcome. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29]. If, on the other hand, the defendant has a
valid reason to relitigate (for example, certification was not foreseeable and he interposed
defenses against the named plaintiff that would be inappropriate against the class), then
protection of the defendant's reliance interest should outweigh efficiency considerations.
Decreasing the opt out rate of notified class members by permitting certification after a
plaintiff's verdict would reduce the chance that putative class members would bring their own
duplicative actions. Thus, requiring a second class action may spawn even further duplicative
litigation: By requiring prejudgment certification and notification in a new class action, class
members will be less certain of victory and may opt out to press their own individual actions.
This multiplicity of action is precisely the result that rule 23 was designed to avoid.
The alternative to a second class action, individual claims by class members, is even less
efficient. Moreover, the availability of issue preclusion undermines whatever valid reason the
class opponent might have in litigating each claim separately. Cf. Jimenez. v. Weinberger, 523
F.2d 689, 701 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting inefficiency of requiring second (b)(2) class action), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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table avoidance. As discussed earlier, some courts have relied on
waiver"1  or amendment of class notice;" 9 but they have done so in
unclear, misleading, and potentially dangerous ways. Other courts
simply have signalled approval of postjudgment certification sub silen-
rio in cases in which the plaintiff or other class member has appealed
successfully a negative certification decision following judgment for
the individual plaintiff.' 20
The development of the waiver exception after Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp. 12' demonstrates the difficulty of categorizing equitable
exceptions. As originally conceived, the Katz test case procedure was
justifiable because it promoted the defendant's interest in maintaining
sound business relations with the class. 12 2 On the other hand, apply-
ing Katz to imply waiver of the defendant's right to object to a
plaintiff's request for postjudgment certification is unprincipled if the
defendant has not agreed explicitly to be bound to a class judgment
and, in fact, has opposed delay in certification.12 3  Focusing on an
isolated act-such as a summary judgment motion by a defendant-to
infer intent to forego substantive rights represents an unacceptably
narrow view, and may prejudice the defendant's reliance interest. 2 4
The case law involving sub silentio approval of postjudgment certi-
fication on appeal 12 5 requires further judicial clarification before its
role in postjudgment certification law can be evaluated properly. The
failure of courts to identify and weigh competing party interests,
however, is unacceptable. Valid policy reasons may exist for permit-
ting a plaintiff to appeal a certification denial following judgment, but
such approval should not be forthcoming, as it apparently was in
11 See notes 43-57 and accompanying text supra.
n See notes 65-71 and accompanying text supra.
120 See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
121 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
122 See note 47 and accompanying text supra. The Katz court did not address the question
whether parties have the power to waive a requirement of the federal rules, the authority for
which is derived from the Rules Enabling Act.
1'3 See cases cited at notes 55-57 supra.
'2 See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra. When moving for dismissal or pressing for
summary judgment, the defendant probably is aware that a favorable ruling will prevent him
from certifying and binding the class to his judgment. But if he loses his motion, he may
proceed on the assumption that he is defending an individual action if the plaintiff has not yet
moved to certify. If the defendant were to raise defenses unique to the individual plaintiff or
negotiate a settlement that he assumes does not extend to the class, the subsequent expansion of
his liability to include the class would prejudice his reliance rights. See id. The waiver doctrine
ignores such intervening interests and holds the defendant's effort to dismiss the action as
conclusive grounds by itself to permit certification at any point before or after judgment for the
plaintiff. Courts should consider a, number of other relevant factors in determining whether a
certification decision would prejudice the defendant. See notes 154-63 and accompanying text
infra.
1 5 See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
1242 [Vol. 66:1218
1981] POSTJUDGMENT CERTIFICATION 1243
McDonald and Roper, absent a full consideration of the defendant's
reliance interests and the plaintiffs need to certify. 126  Arguably, the
Supreme Court in McDonald considered whether certification would
prejudice the defendant, 12 7 but the Court also should have considered
the option of refusing to certify the class to protect the defendant.
2 8
The suggestion of Postow v. OBA Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion' 29 that postjudgment certification is permissible when the (c)(2)
notice letter sent to class members does not refer to the judgment 30 is
126 The one-way intervention problem was raised only by Justice Powell, who dissented in
both cases. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 354 & n.14 (1980); United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 401 n.4 (1977) (by implication). The District of
Columbia Circuit has characterized the McDonald decision as one in which the "majority
expressed no concerns about the possibility of prejudice to the defendant," and Roper as not
considering the one-way intervention issue. Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d
1370, 1382, 1383 n.28 (1980).
127 In McDonald, the class opponent, United Airlines, settled with the individual parties
following denial of class certification. Dissenting from the majority's holding that a putative
class member could intervene postjudgment to appeal a denial of class certification, Justice
Powell argued that after denial of certification rendered the action a nonclass action and the
settlement was accepted, United "was prejudiced by [the putative class member's] attempt to
reopen the case," 432 U.S. at 400, particularly because three years had elapsed between the
time of certification denial and postjudgment appeal. 432 U.S. at 401 n.4. The majority
rejected Justice Powell's argument on the ground that computation of liability had been
determined in previous litigation involving United (see Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517
F.2d 387, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1975)), and that the instant settlement was merely an application of
the earlier liability determination. Thus, according to the majority, any unfair "surprise" was
harmless, apparently because United could not have altered the settlement outcome. 432 U.S.
at 393 n. 14. See Note, Resurrecting Claims through Post-Judgment Appeal of Class Certification Denial,
64 IowA L. REv. 964, 971 (1979) (United Airlines should reasonably have expected postjudg-
ment challenge to denial of certification and hence was not prejudiced). The majority, how-
ever, gave only "casual treatment" to the possibility that postsettlement certification might
upset the defendant's reliance on the earlier settlement and deter settlements generally. 432
U.S. at 399-401 (Powell, J., dissenting). Most of the majority's discussion concerned whether
the agreement was a "settlement." Id. at 393 n.14. And as in Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (discussed infra), the settlement offer and its acceptance by the
court may have prejudiced the court's ultimate class judgment, if any, and influenced class
members later as to whether to opt out.
In Roper, the class detendant offered a settlement to plaintiffs, and the court entered
judgment over their objection, following the trial court's denial of class certification. As in
McDonald, the majority, in deciding whether to permit postjudgment appeal of the certification
decision, failed to consider the one-way intervention issue, but, unlike McDonald, it did not
even mention the issue of defendant prejudice. Id. The Roper Court may have blindly assumed
that overturning the defendant's settlement with the individual plaintiff obviated the need to
consider the issue.
128 If the named plaintiff has no interest in seeking class recovery, overturning the plaintiff's,
judgment to permit class prosecution as occurred in Roper may be unfair to him. See Develop-
ments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1420 n. 163. In such cases, a second class action may be
the only means to avoid prejudicing the class opponent. Thus, an appellate court should weigh
the disadvantages of requiring a new class action against the alleged prejudice to the parties
resulting from late certification.
129 627 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
130 627 F.2d at 1383-84. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text supra.
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also misplaced. Even if the federal rules provide for a class letter that
omits reference to the judgment, 13' keeping the class ignorant of the
outcome in order to reduce one-way intervention 3 2 does not protect
the actual interests of the defendant. 3 3  If the defendant has entered
settlement negotiations or has offered defenses on the assumption that
he is litigating an individual action, any harm resulting from post-
judgment certification would not be reduced by altering the content of
the class letter. A notice letter exception may even institutionalize
prejudice within the class. Some class members will be aware of a
judgment regardless of the content of the letter, thus ensuring that
class members will have disparate levels of awareness as to the status
of the litigation. 34
13' Rule 23(c)(2) is silent as to notice requirements other than the inclusion of the three items
listed in subdivisions (c)(2)(A)-(C). The only possibly relevant provision is subdivision 23(d)'s
discretionary notice section, which grants courts the power to "requir[e], for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action."
Apparently, rule 23 does not forbid notice that includes reference to the plaintiff's
judgment, see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir.) (mention of plaintiff's
judgment included in contemplated postjudgment notice), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). In
fact, prohibiting such communication between the attorney and the class may be impracticable
or even unconstitutional under the first amendment. See generally Comment, Judicial Screening of
Class Action Communications, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 671 (1980); Note, Restrictions on Communication
by Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE LJ. 360, 370-84. Furthermore, this type of gag
rule would represent a significant step beyond current practice, which only prohibits transmis-
sion of inaccurate or misleading information. Finally, a broader remedial provision regulating
class communication would be ineffective if a class member who was not directly involved in
the initial action had any incentive to inform other class members of the judgment.
132 Postow v. OBA Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 1383.
133 Prohibiting notice of judgment would not serve any of the four justifications for the rule
against one-way intervention. See notes 73-93 and accompanying text supra. Because a court
probably would not certify and order notice if the defendant were to win on the merits, there is
no mutuality of estoppel. If all the judge need do is delete reference to the judgment in the
notice letter, certification may occur late in the litigation, and cost sharing is not encouraged.
For the same reason, the defendant is not earlier informed as to the nature and scope of his
liability, and thus his reliance interest is not protected. And though potential class members
may not know personally of the judgment, they still are not subjected to any "risk." At worst,
they might opt out to sue the class opponent independently. Risk exposure, on the other hand,
requires that the party be subjected to the risk of being bound by an adverse judgment. Thus,
there is little justification for depriving the class of relevant litigation information. Cf Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir.) (informing class of judgment advantageous
because opting out decision "more informed"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
134 In many actions, a number of class members are aware of developments in the pending
action because they are similarly situated with other class members. For example, in Postow v.
OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the class involved only 41
customers of a local savings and loan, and it is likely that some of them were aware of the
litigation. Yet the court made no attempt to discern whether they had actual knowledge of the
existence of ajudgment in their favor. In actions involving, for example, employment discrimi-
nation against a common employer, a class member may learn of the plaintiff's judgment other
than by letter from the court. See, e.g., United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 387-90
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The problem with equitable exceptions is that they operate within
a framework that brands one-way intervention a per se evil. If this
made sense when the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel was in vogue, it
is no longer appropriate now that courts facing questions of issue
preclusion use a discretionary test designed to fit the circumstances of
a particular litigation. 135 As long as courts refuse to modernize their
approach to certification questions to accord with modern res judicata
law, confusion and impairment of party interests will linger.
IV
PROPOSAL
The foregoing suggests that the one-way intervention framework
should be abandoned altogether. First, developments in res judicata
law suggest that one-way intervention sometimes may be appropriate.
Second, predetermining the sequence of certification and judgment
wastes judicial resources and prejudices defendants' and plaintiffs'
interests. Finally, attempts at equitable avoidance seem artificial and
still may prejudice the parties.
A. Structuring Reform
Given the alternatives of rule reform and judicial refinement of
certification analysis under rule 23, rule reform would be the simpler
and more effective course, although an unlikely one in the near
future. 136 Nevertheless, an analysis of the rule's language, combined
with a review of the underlying goals of the drafters, suggests that
courts may adopt a more flexible view of one-way intervention and yet
remain within the confines of the language in rule 23 and Supreme
Court precedent.
Among courts that view rule 23 as prohibiting one-way interven-
tion, there is little agreement as to which language in the rule accom-
plishes the result. Some courts have ignored the Advisory Committee's
focus on subdivision (c)(3)1 37 and have relied instead on other subdivi-
sions.1 38 In fact, it appears that none of the subdivisions of rule 23,
(1977). Moreover, a gag order imposed on notice is impractical because other types of
suggestive communication with the class attorney are permitted. See, e.g., Postow v. OBA Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 1383 n.30 (describing permitted correspondence between
attorney and class).
135 See note 79 supra.
130 See note 6 supra.
' Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 106.
13' For example, the following cases were decided in the same year by the Seventh Circuit:
Roberts v. American Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 1975) (subdivision (c)(1)
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read literally, dictates the order in which certification and judgment
on the merits should occur. 3
Subdivision (c)(1) does not state that certification must precede
judgment; it requires only that the court make a class determination
"[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action." 14
0
Notwithstanding the statement in the Advisory Committee's Note
disapproving one-way intervention, 141 the deletion of language from
an earlier proposed draft of subdivision (c)(1) stating that the class
order must be "before the decision on the merits" indicates that the
Committee did not intend to establish a rigid ordering of the (c)(1)
precludes post-summary judgment certification because such certification necessarily "de-
layed"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 (7th
Cir. 1975) (citing subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2), but also quoting from Advisory Committee Notes,
supra note 4, at 105-06); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum)
(citing (c)(2) and (c)(3)). Jimenez also interpreted the Supreme Court's discussion of one-way
intervention in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) as suggesting
that "subparagraph (c)(1) was specifically intended to deal with post-merits certifications." 523
F.2d at 698 n.17. American Pipe, however, does not seem to point to any one specific subdivision
of rule 23 as prohibiting one-way intervention. See 414 U.S. at 547-49. Moreover, some courts
appear to have identified only Supreme Court precedent (see note 39 and accompanying text
supra) or only the Rules Advisory Committee Notes (see Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 354 n. 14 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing only Advisory Committee Notes and
subdivision (c)(2) in discussing postjudgment certification following appeal)).
139 A court seeking to certify postjudgment may have available two other courses of action if
it concludes that rule 23 expressly requires prejudgment certification. First, an appellate court
may find that a procedure in the trial court violates the federal rules but nevertheless is not
grounds for reversal under the harmless error doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976); note 153
and accompanying text infra. Second, a court may read rule 1, which calls for construction of
the federal rules so as "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action," together with rule 23 to permit postjudgment certification, where denying it would
undermine the broader purposes of efficiency and promotion of party rights associated with the
federal class action rule. Cf. IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 426, at 676 (C. Wright ed. 1960) (citing rule 1 to support argument for different
reading of rule 14(a) where "literal reading" would subvert joinder policies).
140 The intent of the drafters of this language has been the subject of some debate. Compare
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
("Rule 2 3 (c)(1) contemplates a prompt determination after the filing of the action."), with
Frankel, supra note 15, at 41 ("[T]he time when a hard determination is 'practicable' as to the
propriety of a class action will obviously vary from case to case.") and Note, supra note 90, at
362 ("[Tlhe ...vague limitation of 'as soon as practicable' seemingly grants courts broad
discretion in deciding when to make a class, determination.").
The second sentence of subdivision (c)(1), which states that "[a]n order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits," assumes that the order is entered before judgment. The sentence is permissive and not
prohibitive, however, and it does not apply to the original entry of a (c)(1) order. Moreover,
courts have not interpreted this language to prevent postjudgment certification in (b)(1) and
(b)(2) actions, although it applies equally to them. See note 143 and accompanying text infra.
141 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 4, at 106.
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and merits determinations. 142 Furthermore, judicial interpretation of
subdivision (c)(1) in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, to which (c)(1) applies
with equal force, leaves no doubt that the adopted version does not
require postponement of judgment until after a certification deci-
sion. 14
3
Similarly, subdivision 23(c)(2), which sets out the notice require-
ments for (b)(3) actions, does not mandate prejudgment certification.
Subdivision (c)(2) states only that (b)(3) notice is mandatory; it is
silent as to the timing of notice. At most, subdivision (c)(2)(B), which
requires the court to include in the judgment any putative class
member "who do[es] not request exclusion," assumes the existence of
notice before judgment. Nevertheless, this provision does not prevent
the court from, for example, later amending the judgment so as to
provide class members the opportunity to opt out.144
Finally, subdivision 23(c)(3), which governs the scope of judg-
ment, also assumes that a class has been determined beforehand. 145 A
court simply could announce, however, that no one has received
notice yet and hold the judgment open until notification is accom-
plished. 14' Even courts that interpret rule 23 to require prejudgment
142 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325, 386 (1964); cf. Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit (Second Supplemental Report), 37 F.R.D. 499, 522 (1965).
Unfortunately, the Committee did not articulate its reasons for deleting the provision. Accord-
ing to one commentator, "[t]he present version of the rule seems to contemplate an earlier
determination [of class certification] than did the original draft." Landers, Of Legalized Black-
mail and Legalized Thot: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 842, 892 n.170 (1974). Professor Landers is correct, however, only if the decision on the
merits is not precipitated by a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion, which may
precede the moment at which certification is "practicable." See text accompanying notes
95-100 supra. Otherwise, the Committee's deletion permits a precertification decision on the
merits.
143 In permitting postjudgment certification, courts have found no language barriers in
subdivision (c)(1). See, e.g., Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1182-83 (D.C. Cir.
1976), aff'd 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 698, 700 & n.25 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Burke v. Mathiasen's Tanker Indus., Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 790, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (class determination postponed until after decision on
motion to dismiss); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 196, 208 (N.D. Ga. 1974)
(dictum). In addition, these cases suggest that nothing in the language of subdivision (c)(1)
indicates that the interprdtation of the "as soon as practicable" requirement should be any
different for (b)(3) actions than for (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. See also cases cited at note 159 infa.
144 Subdivision (c)(2) does not state that the judgment must occur in the future; it says only
which members the ultimate judgment "will include" (emphasis added).
145 See FFD. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(3) ("The judgment [in (b)(3) actions] . . . shall include and
specify or describe those to whom . . . notice ... was directed .... ").
146 Subdivisions (c)(2) amd (c)(3) presumably were designed in part to ensure that the
decision to opt out is respected. The interpretation of the rule suggested here would be
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certification have suggested that the possibility of a more liberal inter-
pretation is not foreclosed. 47
In addition, neither American Pipe nor Eisen forbids one-way inter-
vention. In holding that the filing of the complaint commenced the
action for all members of the class, American Pipe focused only on the
representational nature of the (b)(3) class action; 148 permitting one-
way intervention does not render the action any less representational.
In Eisen, the majority disapproved of a mini-hearing because rule 23
does not provide for shifting costs of notice to the defendant, and
because the hearing impermissibly delayed the (c)(1) order.149 Be-
cause Eisen involved an interlocutory appeal,' 50 the Court could not
have held that postjudgment certification was impermissible. Thus,
although the Supreme Court may have misled lower courts by review-
ing a historical rationale no longer supportable under modern doc-
trine, neither these cases nor rule 23 precludes trial courts from
adopting a more flexible approach to certification timing.151
consistent with this purpose: A member's request to opt out would be honored postjudgment,
as long as made according to the particular requirements of the class notice.
141 See, e.g., Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 274 (10th Cir. 1977)
(suggesting that postponement of certification sometimes may be justified); Peritz v. Liberty
Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975) (reserving the question).
148 See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
149 See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra. Although Eisen has been said to be "about
one-way intervention," notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra, the mini-hearing did not
result in judgment for the plaintiffs. A mini-hearing creates a type of one-way intervention only
in the sense that putative class members may determine whether the trial judge is favorably
disposed to rule for the class on the merits at some future point in the action; this situation is
not comparable to the no-risk intervention that commentators criticized before rule 23 was
amended. Moreover, the adoption of an interpretation of Eisen as prohibiting procedures that
may inform the class as to who eventually will win on the merits raises troubling questions
about the propriety of any merits-related ruling before certification. For example, ruling on the
admissibility of important evidence may be necessary in shaping the litigation early, but under
this one-way intervention interpretation of Eisen, a court could not subsequently certify the
class, because class members may be aware of the ruling and use it in deciding whether to opt
out. Surely, the Eisen Court did not intend this result. Finally, though the Supreme Court's
language may be ambiguous as to the one-way intervention question, the Second Circuit's
decision, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), clearly indicates that
Eisen was not a one-way intervention case. The court noted that although the rule does not
provide for mini-hearings, "there may be summary judgments, [and] dismissals with or
without prejudice .. " 479 F.2d at 1015. At least one court has argued that the Supreme
Court implicitly accepted this argument. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801,
804 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1975).
10 417 U.S. at 161-69.
111 This is precisely the tack taken by some of the courts that have permitted postjudgment
certification. See Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 274 (10th Cir.
1977) ("Eisen did not rule out specific consideration of any aspect of the merits of a case before
determination of the class action issue .... "); Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d
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B. Case-by-Case Evaluation of Party Interests in Certification
Experience with a per se rule against one-way intervention indi-
cates that class certification decisions are best left to the discretion of
the trial judge. As the one most familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the litigation, the trial judge is uniquely capable of deter-
mining whether certification after a judgment on the merits would
promote class interests and judicial efficiency without impairing the
reliance interest of the class opponent. 152  The trial court's determina-
tion under this scheme should be reversible on appeal only if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion that prejudices one of the parties. 153
In managing the certification stage of class litigation, the trial
judge may draw heavily on the framework developed in recent years
in the law of offensive use of issue preclusion by nonparties. Substan-
tially analogous to one-way intervention in class suits, 154 the modern
law of issue preclusion applies a discretionary test that focuses on
party interests and judicial efficiency. The Supreme Court in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore155 recently endorsed the issue preclusion provisions
230, 240-41 (10th Cir. 1975) (Doyle, J., dissenting), modified on rehearing, 523 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.
1975) (en banc); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 71 F.R.D. 334, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("[N]either
[Eisen] nor Rule 23 precludes the defendant from proceeding to the merits without notifica-
tion. . . ."), rev'don other grounds, 596 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1979); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank,
381 F. Supp. 801, 803 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("[n]othing in either the Eisen decision nor Rule 23
itself precludes" ruling on a defendant's merits motion before certification), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other-grounds, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
152 Although a discretionary determination is by definition less certain for litigants, courts
have operated since 1966 within a discretionary framework in rule 23 litigation. See note 94
supra. As class actions have become more complex, the exercise of discretion in their manage-
ment has become more important than when the rule was restructured. One commentator
noted that "[i]f class suits are to be justified substantively, . . . a class action rule cannot be
applied mechanically. The trial judge, and not the rulemaker, must bear chief responsibility for
the design of class action procedures." Developments-Class Actions, supra note 39, at 1366. Cf
Holland, supra note 79, at 631-33 (arguing that trend in res judicata law toward judicial
discretion and away from mechanical rules is desirable).
153 Under the harmless error doctrine, an appellate court would reverse the certification
order if, for example, the class opponent could demonstrate impairment of its reasonable
reliance upon the nonclass character of the action. In the absence of such prejudice, the trial
court ruling would be upheld. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976) ("On the hearing of any appeal or
writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.").
1-4 One-way intervention is different from issue preclusion only in that the intervening class
member does not have to initiate his own action to take advantage of the named plaintiff's
judgment. Quite different is the situation in which certification has occurred prior to a class
judgment and a plaintiff who opted out of that judgment seeks to assert it in a new action. In
the latter scenario, issue preclusion would be inappropriate because the integrity of the opting
out mechanism should be protected. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1789, at 183-84 (1972).
' 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979), discussed at note 79 supra. In permitting offensive issue
preclusion, Parklane Hosiery Co. relied principally on § 88 of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments,
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of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which provide that preclusion
depends in part on whether the party to be precluded had "an ade-
quate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in
the initial action," 156 and whether "it was not sufficiently foreseeable
at the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context
of a subsequent action." 157 The inquiry amounts to a determination
of whether issue preclusion would prejudice the party to be pre-
cluded.1,58  Thus, a trial judge deciding whether to permit one-way
intervention in class litigation should determine whether the class
opponent had a full and fair opportunity or incentive to press his class
defenses, and whether liability to the class was foreseeable after the
initial judgment. 15 9  If the answers to both inquiries are affirmative,
postjudgment certification is appropriate; if the class opponent can
demonstrate that he would have litigated with significantly more vigor
in the earlier stages of the litigation or would have presented different
defenses had the class been certified earlier, the court should deny
certification. 160
although both § 68.1 and § 88 are relevant to the determination of issue preclusion. Section 88
provides that, in addition to the considerations enumerated in § 68.1 (discussed at text accompa-
nying notes 156 & 157 infra), courts should consider, inter alia, whether a party seeking
preclusion could have effected joinder in the first action, whether the precluded party would be
prejudiced, or whether "[o]ther compelling circumstances" exist to render relitigation appro-
priate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29].
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(e)(iii) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 28].
15, Id. § 68.1(e)(ii) [§ 28].
18 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(6) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29]
(considering whether application of issue preclusion would "prejudice the interests of another
party"). See also Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 874, 936 (1958) (courts should balance the interest in reducing litigation against unfair-
ness to defendants in multiparty litigation).
1' The discretionary application of postjudgment certification in rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
actions under current law, see notes 40-41 & 143 and accompanying text supra, may involve the
type of analysis suggested here by examining whether the action has been treated by the class
opponent all along as a class action. Such analysis assumes that a defendant who has treated an
action as a class action from the beginning of the litigation would not be prejudiced. See Senter
v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 521-22 (6th Cir.) ((b)(2) certification permissible
where parties proceeded on assumption that action was class action, despite absence of formal
certification order), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight,
505 F.2d 40, 51 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Bing v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1973); Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 793 n.4
(9th Cir. 1973), rev'don other grounds, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); cf. Nance v. Union Carbide Corp.,
540 F.2d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1976) ((b)(2) action not permitted where plaintiff disclaimed
intention to seek certification, and action treated as individual action), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 953
(1977); Case & Co. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1975) (class determination
not permitted where parties treated suit as individual action).
'"o See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra. For example, the court might consider
denying postjudgment certification if the plaintiff precipitated, without reasonable justification,
an early merits decision by moving for summary judgment before requesting certification. Cf
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In determining whether certification and classwide liability expo-
sure was foreseeable when the class opponent defended against the
claims of the named plaintiff, a defendant's motion to dismiss or
motion for summary judgment prior to the certification motion would
be relevant, but, unlike its treatment under the "waiver" exception,
it would not be conclusive evidence.'16  If the defendant anticipated
separate class litigation and selected a litigation strategy against the
individual plaintiff that was incompatible with defending against a
class, then he may argue that certification would prejudice his reliance
interests and deny him a full and fair opportunity to present his
defenses.162  In some cases, the court might determine that the de-
fendant should move that the action not be certified as a class action
before pressing for the merits if subsequent certification would preju-
dice the defendant's position.'6 3
A discretionary, interest analysis approach to (b)(3) certification
timing would offer three advantages over both the per se rule against
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29] (denying issue
preclusion ifjoinder in first action was possible).
161 See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra; note 124 supra. A "unique sequence" of
certification and subsequent decertification may also make class liability more foreseeable. See
text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
162 If the defendant has presented defenses against the individual plaintiff that may be
inappropriate against certain class members, the court may also consider forming subclasses so
as to deny certification to these members and permit certification as to the rest. See Eisen v.
Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179-81 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting in
part); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
If the court makes a certification decision before judgment, it should consider certifying its
order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See note 59 supra. Although
commentators have called § 1292 a "limited" remedy, see id., considerations of economy and
fairness sometimes would support its application to prevent party prejudice postjudgment and
to preserve resources. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently has signalled its affinity for the §
1292(b) remedy:
[O]ur ruling in [Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), in which the
Court barred prejudgment appeal as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291] was
not intended to preclude motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) seeking discretionary
interlocutory appeal for review of the certification ruling .... In some cases such
an appeal would promise substantial savings of time and resources or for other
reasons should be viewed hospitably.
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 n.8 (1980). But cf id. at 355 n.17
(Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting need for legislative reform to establish workable certifica-
tion appeals policy); H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1981), discussed at note 6 supra
(providing for interlocutory appeals); H.R. REP. No. 96-1008 (pt. I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980) (discussing same).
1'3 Rule 23(c)(1) does not state who is responsible for initiating or pursuing a certification
request. Generally placing the burden on the plaintiff, however, would comport with the goal
of protecting the defendant's reliance interest. See CLAss ACTION STUDY, supra note 89, at 13
(noting that defendants raise a significant portion of (c)(1) motions); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.50, at 421 & n. 1 (2d ed. 1981). Alternatively, the court may have a duty to
render a (c)(1) determination in the absence of a motion by a party. Id. at 421 & n. 13.
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one-way intervention and the developing equitable exceptions ap-
proach. First, an evaluation of party interests would allow a court to
avoid the harsh results that sometimes follow from strict adherence to
the one-way intervention rule. 164 For example, a court would have
the opportunity to evaluate weak claims before undertaking a review
of certification issues, and certification would be available to a trial
court after reversal on the merits by an appeals court. Moreover, by
addressing the issue of whether certification in a particular instance
would unfairly prejudice the class defendant, a court could also avoid
the potentially unjust results of the equitable exceptions cases. 6 5
Second, judicial articulation of the underlying factors of party
prejudice may alter favorably the parties' pre-trial litigation behavior.
For example, under the current waiver approach, the prohibition
against one-way intervention applies until a defendant moves unsuc-
cessfully for summary judgment; the plaintiff apparently then may
move for judgment without attempting to certify the class. 16 6 Under
the proposed test, a plaintiff aware of the court's emphasis in deter-
mining whether the class defendant was surprised and prejudiced by
late certification might inform the defendant ahead of time that he
intends to certify postjudgment in order to prevent the defendant from
relying to his detriment on the apparent nonclass character of the
action. Alternatively, the plaintiff or defendant might move for certifi-
cation before pursuing any judgment on the merits. The court then
could determine the best way to order the various motions, consider-
ing in advance the interests of both the parties and the class.
The third advantage goes to the heart of the role of subdivision
23(c). As suggested earlier, courts have begun to use 23(c)'s proce-
dural requirements to burden the (b)(3) action unnecessarily, and
have even used 23(c) to terminate class litigation. 167 Yet there is no
reason to single out the (b)(3) action for harsh treatment under this
subdivision of the rule.6 8  If courts are suspicious of consumer class
164 See notes 94-117 and accompanying text supra.
1'5 See notes 118-35 and accompanying text supra.
166 See Postow v. OBA Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 627 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980); notes
56-57 and accompanying text supra. Under certain circumstances the failure of the plaintiff to
seek formal certification before the summary judgment motion may justify a finding that the
plaintiff has waived the "advantage" of rule 23. Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211, 214-15
(D. Vt. 1973) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment prior to seeking certification resulted
in dismissal of class aspects of suit), aff'd sub noma. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975);
cf. Izaguirre v. Tankersley, 516 F. Supp. 755 (D. Or. 1981) (dictum) (waiver by defendant of
postjudgment certification when defendant initiates merits motion).
167 Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 273-74 (10th Cir. 1977);
Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1975).
I6s Judicial leniency in permitting (b)(3) actions to be filed under subdivision (b)(2) renders
the higher procedural requirement of the former provision anomolous. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
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actions, as some have suggested they should be,'69 they should vent
their suspicions through the already tough requirements enunciated in
subdivision (b)(3). 170  Using subdivision (c) as a screening device
results in judicial inefficiency and wasted effort by plaintiffs who
commence class actions, only to find out after years in court that a
procedural error prevents them from certifying. Courts should make
the class determination early and should not dismiss the action after a
significant investment of time and effort unless the class defendant
demonstrates that the procedure so prejudiced him that only a denial
of certification will remedy the harm. By shifting to a test that encour-
ages parties and courts to think in terms of substantive party interests,
class actions that deserve class treatment will survive, while only those
in which irremediable prejudice precludes class prosecution will be
relegated to a new, second action or terminated altogether.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of postjudgment certification cases provides further evi-
dence for the broader charge against current class action practice:
Courts dwell on procedure, at the expense of substantive party
rights.17 ' Developments in the law since the 1966 amendments to
rule 23 have changed fundamentally the foundation of a judicially
established rule against one-way intervention, so that it is now an
aberration in the larger procedural scheme of judicial discretion in
class action management. To date, efforts by courts to squirm out
from under the rule using various equitable doctrines are misfocused
and may be counterproductive. Courts should recognize that the
Rules Advisory Committee intended to marry class action procedure
to res judicata principles and that, consequently, the modern view of
res judicata calls for a more flexible approach to postjudgment certifi-
cation. Rule 23(c) as currently drafted should not preclude judges
from managing class litigation so as to promote party interests, or
from striving towards what Professor Miller predicts will be "sophisti-
cation, restraint, and stabilization in class action practice." 172  By
adopting a discretionary party interest analysis test founded on mod-
em principles of issue preclusion, courts would make the (b)(3) claim
less controversial and more effective.
L. Stevenson Parker
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AqD PROCEDURE § 1775, at 22-24, 49-50 (1972) (arguing for
non-(b)(3) treatment even in actions involving money damages); Developments-Class Actions,
supra note 39, at 1626; note 42 supra; text accompanying note 72 supra.
1S9 See generally Kirkham, note 8 supra; Simon, note 8 supra.
170 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
171 Berry, supra note 5, at 300.
172 Miller, supra note 5, at 680.
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